**Supplement:**

**Truth Sensitivity and Partisan Bias in Responses to Misinformation**

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## Political Affiliation

In addition to the analyses reported in the main article, we also conducted exploratory analyses to investigate whether self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans differ in terms of their truth sensitivity, response threshold, and partisan bias. We also explored if any such differences are consistent across Judgment Type (i.e., veracity judgment versus sharing decisions) and if any of our experimental manipulations had different effects for self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans.

### Experiment 1

**Truth sensitivity.** To explore potential group differences in truth sensitivity, we submitted $d'$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first two variables as between-subjects factors and the third variable as a within-subjects factor (see Table S1). Replicating the results of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Judgment Type, $F(1, 369) = 244.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .398$, indicating that truth sensitivity was greater for veracity judgments than sharing decisions. More important for the current question, there was also a significant main effect of Political Affiliation, $F(1, 369) = 6.31$, $p = .012$, $\eta_p^2 = .017$, indicating that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans. This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 369) = 4.48$, $p = .035$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$, indicating that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans for ideology-incongruent headlines, $F(1, 369) = 12.20$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .032$, but not for ideology-congruent headlines, $F(1, 369) = 0.42$, $p = .517$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$.

**Response threshold.** To explore potential group differences in response thresholds and partisan bias, we submitted $c$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first two variables as between-subjects factors and the third variable as a within-subjects factor (see Table S1). Replicating the partisan-bias effect obtained in our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 369) = 407.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .525$, indicating that participants showed a lower acceptance threshold for ideology-congruent headlines compared to ideology-incongruent headlines. The ANOVA also revealed a significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 369) = 4.99$, $p = .026$, $\eta_p^2 = .013$, and a significant two-way interaction between Political Affiliation and Judgment Type, $F(1, 369) = 3.91$, $p = .049$, $\eta_p^2 = .010$, which were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence, Political Affiliation, and Judgment Type, $F(1, 369) = 21.49$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .055$. To decompose this interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVAs for the two Judgment Type conditions.

For veracity judgments, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 183) = 314.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .632$, which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 183) = 39.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .179$. Post-hoc analyses specified this interaction by showing that partisan bias in veracity judgments was greater among Democrats, $F(1, 92) = 433.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .825$, than Republicans, $F(1, 91) = 48.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .348$. For sharing decisions, the ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 186) = 159.38$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .461$,

but this main effect was not qualified by a two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence

and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 186) = 2.07$, $p = .152$, $\eta_p^2 = .011$. Instead, partisan bias in sharing

decisions was similar in size for Democrats, $F(1, 95) = 97.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .508$, and

Republicans, $F(1, 91) = 71.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .438$.

**Experiment 2**

   **Truth sensitivity.** To explore potential group differences in truth sensitivity, we

submitted $d'$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Cognitive

Reflection: low vs. high) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2

(Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first three variables as

between-subjects factors and the last one as a within-subjects factor (see Table S2). Replicating

the results of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed significant main

effects of Judgment Type, $F(1, 722) = 202.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .219$, and Cognitive Reflection,

$F(1, 722) = 9.65$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .013$. Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, a significant

main effect of Political Affiliation indicated that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than

Republicans, $F(1, 722) = 6.04$, $p = .014$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$. This main effect was qualified by a

significant three-way interaction of Political Affiliation, Ideology-Congruence, and Judgment

Type, $F(1, 722) = 9.00$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$. To decompose this interaction, we conducted

separate 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent

vs. incongruent) ANOVAs for the two Judgment Type conditions.

   For veracity judgments, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Political

Affiliation, $F(1, 359) = 6.07$, $p = .014$, $\eta_p^2 = .017$, which was qualified by a significant two-way

interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 359) = 9.79$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 =$

.027, indicating that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans for ideology-

incongruent headlines, $F(1, 359) = 14.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .039$, but not for ideology-congruent headlines, $F(1, 359) = 0.01$, $p = .909$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$. For sharing decisions, the ANOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects (all $F$s $< 1.01$, all $p$s $> .32$).

**Response threshold.** To explore potential group differences in response thresholds and partisan bias, we submitted $c$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Cognitive Reflection: low vs. high) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first three variables as between-subjects factors and the second variable as a within-subjects factor (see Table 2). Replicating the findings of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 722) = 555.72$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .435$, a significant main effect of Judgment Type, $F(1, 722) = 178.31$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .198$, and a significant main effect of Cognitive Reflection, $F(1, 722) = 4.64$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .006$. More important for the current question, the ANOVA also revealed a significant two-way interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 722) = 15.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .021$, which was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of Political Affiliation, Ideology-Congruence, and Judgment Type, $F(1, 722) = 7.50$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .010$. To decompose this interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVAs for the two Judgment Type conditions.

For veracity judgments, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 359) = 281.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .440$, which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 359) = 24.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .064$. Post-hoc analyses specified this interaction by showing that partisan bias in

veracity judgments was greater among Democrats, $F(1, 182) = 312.96$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .632$, than

Republicans, $F(1, 177) = 55.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .239$. For sharing decisions, the ANOVA

revealed only a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 367) = 278.17$, $p < .001$,

$\eta_p^2 = .431$, but this main effect was not qualified by a two-way interaction between Ideology-

Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 367) = 0.61$, $p = .435$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$. Instead, partisan bias

in sharing decisions was similar in size for Democrats, $F(1, 182) = 184.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .503$,

and Republicans, $F(1, 185) = 108.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .369$.

**Experiment 3**

      **Truth sensitivity.** To explore potential group differences in truth sensitivity, we

submitted $d'$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Self: self-

affirmation vs. self-threat) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2

(Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first three variables as

between-subjects factors and the last one as a within-subjects factor (see Table S3). Replicating

the results of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed significant main

effects of Judgment Type, $F(1, 743) = 587.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .441$, a significant two-way

interaction between Judgment Type and Self, $F(1, 743) = 6.14$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, and a

significant two-way interaction between Judgment Type and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 743) =$

$8.41$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .011$. More important for the current question, a significant main effect of

Political Affiliation indicated that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans,

$F(1, 743) = 18.56$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .025$, replicating the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. This

main effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of Political Affiliation, Ideology-

Congruence, and Judgment Type, $F(1, 723) = 8.57$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$. To decompose this

interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2

(Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVAs for the two Judgment Type conditions.

For veracity judgments, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Political Affiliation, $F(1, 379) = 11.98$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .031$, which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 379) = 12.22$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .031$, indicating that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans for ideology-incongruent headlines, $F(1, 379) = 22.28$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .056$, but not for ideology-congruent headlines, $F(1, 379) = 0.74$, $p = .390$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$.

For sharing decisions, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Political Affiliation, $F(1, 368) = 7.02$, $p = .008$, $\eta_p^2 = .019$, and a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 368) = 7.77$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .021$, which were qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 368) = 6.20$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .017$. Further analyses revealed that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans in sharing ideology-congruent headlines, $F(1, 368) = 10.73$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .028$, but not in sharing ideology-incongruent headlines, $F(1, 368) = 0.23$, $p = .629$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$.

**Response threshold.** To explore potential group differences in response thresholds and partisan bias, we submitted $c$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Self: self-affirmation vs. self-threat) × 2 (Judgment Type: veracity-judgment vs. sharing-decision) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first two variables as between-subjects factors and the third variable as a within-subjects factor (see Table S3). Replicating the findings of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 743) = 541.35$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .421$, a significant main effect of Judgment Type, $F(1, 743) = 293.27$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .283$, and a

significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Judgment Type, $F(1, 743) =$ 6.92, $p = .009$, $\eta_p^2 = .009$. More important for the current question, the ANOVA also revealed a significant two-way interaction of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 743) =$ 7.29, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .010$, which was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between Political Affiliation, Ideology-Congruence, and Judgment Type, $F(1, 743) = 27.75$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2$ $= .036$. To decompose this interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVAs for the two Judgment Type conditions.

For veracity judgments, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 379) = 407.19$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .518$, which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 379) = 38.57$, $p <$ .001, $\eta_p^2 = .092$. Post-hoc analyses specified this interaction by showing that partisan bias in veracity judgments was greater among Democrats, $F(1, 194) = 444.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .696$, than Republicans, $F(1, 185) = 78.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .299$. For sharing decisions, the ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 368) = 181.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .330$, but this main effect was not qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Ideology-Congruence and Political Affiliation, $F(1, 368) = 2.79$, $p = .096$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$. Instead, partisan bias in sharing decisions was similar in size for Democrats, $F(1, 188) = 73.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .280$, and Republicans, $F(1, 180) = 108.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .376$.

## Experiment 4

**Truth sensitivity.** To explore potential group differences in truth sensitivity, we submitted $d'$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2 (Truth Prompt: present vs. absent) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with the first

two variables as between-subjects factors and the third variable as a within-subjects factor (see

Table S4). Replicating the results of our preregistered confirmatory analysis, the ANOVA

revealed significant main effects of Truth Prompt, $F(1, 565) = 5.76$, $p = .017$, $\eta_p^2 = .010$, and

Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 565) = 10.57$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .018$. More important for the current

question, there was also a significant main effect of Political Affiliation indicating that

Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity in their sharing decisions than Republicans, $F(1, 565)$

$= 22.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .038$. This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction

of Political Affiliation and Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 565) = 8.85$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .015$,

indicating that Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity than Republicans for ideology-

congruent headlines, $F(1, 565) = 24.75$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .042$, but not for ideology-incongruent

headlines, $F(1, 565) = 1.95$, $p = .163$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$.

**Response threshold.** To explore potential group differences in response thresholds and

partisan bias, we submitted $c$ scores to a 2 (Political Affiliation: Democrat vs. Republican) × 2

(Truth Prompt: present vs. absent) × 2 (Ideology-Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent)

ANOVA with the first two variables as between-subjects factors and the third variable as a

within-subjects factor (see Table S4). Replicating the findings of our preregistered confirmatory

analysis, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Ideology-Congruence, $F(1, 565) =$

$369.72$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .396$, and a significant main effect of Truth Prompt, $F(1, 565) = 59.00$, $p$

$< .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .095$, which were qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Ideology-

Congruence and Truth Prompt, $F(1, 565) = 32.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .054$. Political Affiliation did

not show any significant main or interaction effects (all $F$s $< 2.19$, all $p$s $> .13$).

**Discussion**

Together, the four studies revealed that (1) Democrats showed greater truth sensitivity in veracity judgments than Republicans and (2) Democrats showed greater partisan bias in veracity judgments than Republicans. These results provide further support for the idea that greater truth sensitivity does not necessarily reduce partisan bias in responses to misinformation. Although this general conclusion is supported by multiple aspects of the current studies, we urge caution in the interpretation of group-related differences in partisan bias. A conceptual problem with the interpretation of group-related differences in partisan bias is that such differences involve an inherent confound between participants' political affiliation and the political slant of the focal information (see Tappin et al., 2020). Whereas for Democrats ideology-congruent information has a pro-Democrat slant and ideology-incongruent information has a pro-Republican slant, the reverse is the case for Republicans. Thus, if the pro-Democrat headlines used in the current studies had incidental features that made them more plausible compared to the pro-Republican headlines, this asymmetry could artificially produce a greater partisan bias among Democrats compared to Republicans. Put differently, what appears to be an interaction between participants' political affiliation and ideology-congruence of the headlines may just be a main effect of the headlines' political slant (Brauer & Judd, 2000). Although we carefully pretested our materials prior to conducting the current set of studies (see Appendix of the main article), it is impossible to completely rule out incidental confounds between political slant and unidentified secondary features of the headlines. These issues do not undermine conclusions about group-related differences in truth sensitivity, because information veracity is manipulated orthogonal to ideology-congruence. They also do not undermine conclusions about general partisan-bias effects that generalize across political affiliation (e.g., effect of truth prompts on partisan bias

independent of political affiliation). However, they do undermine inferences about group-related

differences in partisan bias, such as the potential conclusion that Democrats show greater

partisan bias than Republicans, or vice versa.[1]

**References**

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    to understanding the identification of fake news. *Perspectives on Psychological Science,*

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Brauer, M., & Judd, C. M. (2000). Defining variables in relationship to other variables: When

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Tappin, B. M., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020). Thinking clearly about causal inferences

    of politically motivated reasoning: Why paradigmatic study designs often undermine

    causal inference. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34,* 81-87.

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[1] Different from the pattern obtained in the current studies, Batailler et al. (2022) found that Republicans showed greater partisan bias in the identification of fake news compared to Democrats.

**Table S1.** Signal detection *d′* scores reflecting truth sensitivity and *c* scores reflecting response threshold in responses to political information as a function of ideology-congruence (congruent vs. incongruent), judgment type (veracity judgment vs. sharing decision), and participants' political affiliation (Republicans vs. Democrats), Experiment 1. Higher *d′* scores reflect greater truth sensitivity. Higher *c* scores reflect higher acceptance threshold.

| | Veracity Judgments | | | | Sharing Decisions | | | |
| | Congruent | | Incongruent | | Congruent | | Incongruent | |
| | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *d′* | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .59 | [.48, .69] | .50 | [.40, .59] | -.02 | [-.12, .09] | -.01 | [-.10, .08] |
| Democrats | .63 | [.52, .73] | .77 | [.68, .86] | .01 | [-.09, .11] | .04 | [-.05, .13] |
| *c* | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | -.18 | [-.36, .01] | .39 | [.27, .51] | .29 | [.11, .48] | 1.37 | [1.25, 1.49] |
| Democrats | -.54 | [-.72, -.36] | .65 | [.53, .78] | .60 | [.43, .78] | 1.46 | [1.34, 1.58] |

**Table S2.** Signal detection *d′* scores reflecting truth sensitivity and *c* scores reflecting response threshold in responses to political information as a function of ideology-congruence (congruent vs. incongruent), judgment type (veracity judgment vs. sharing decision), cognitive reflection (low reflection vs. high reflection), and participants' political affiliation (Republicans vs. Democrats), Experiment 2. Higher *d′* scores reflect greater truth sensitivity. Higher *c* scores reflect higher acceptance threshold.

| | Veracity Judgments | | | | Sharing Decisions | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Congruent | | Incongruent | | Congruent | | Incongruent | |
| | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI |
| *d′* | | | | | | | | |
| Low Reflection | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .39 | [.27, .50] | .16 | [.05, .27] | -.07 | [-.18, .05] | -.03 | [-.14, .08] |
| Democrats | .41 | [.30, .53] | .48 | [.37, .60] | -.01 | [-.13, .10] | -.03 | [-.14, .08] |
| High Reflection | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .54 | [.42, .66] | .40 | [.28, .51] | .00 | [-.11, .11] | .00 | [-.11, .11] |
| Democrats | .52 | [.41, .63] | .56 | [.46, .67] | .07 | [-.05, .18] | .00 | [-.11, .11] |
| *c* | | | | | | | | |
| Low Reflection | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | -.21 | [-.39, -.03] | .35 | [.20, .50] | .29 | [.12, .47] | 1.09 | [.94, 1.23] |
| Democrats | -.48 | [-.66, -.30] | .52 | [.37, .67] | .13 | [-.05, .31] | 1.06 | [.91, 1.21] |
| High Reflection | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | -.12 | [-.30, .07] | .35 | [.20, .51] | .47 | [.29, .64] | 1.22 | [1.07, 1.36] |
| Democrats | -.39 | [-.56, -.21] | .52 | [.38, .67] | .38 | [.21, .56] | 1.15 | [1.00, 1.30] |

**Table S3.** Signal detection *d′* scores reflecting truth sensitivity and *c* scores reflecting response threshold in responses to political information as a function of ideology-congruence (congruent vs. incongruent), judgment type (veracity judgment vs. sharing decision), self (self-affirmation vs. self-threat), and participants' political affiliation (Republicans vs. Democrats), Experiment 3. Higher *d′* scores reflect greater truth sensitivity. Higher *c* scores reflect higher acceptance threshold.

| | Veracity Judgments | | | | Sharing Decisions | | | |
| | Congruent | | Incongruent | | Congruent | | Incongruent | |
| | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI | *M* | 95% CI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *d′* | | | | | | | | |
| Self-Affirmation | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .72 | [.61, .84] | .61 | [.50, .72] | -.21 | [-.33, -.10] | -.08 | [-.19, .03] |
| Democrats | .84 | [.73, .95] | .88 | [.77, .98] | -.08 | [-.19, .03] | .02 | [-.09, .12] |
| Self-Threat | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .71 | [.60, .82] | .45 | [.34, .56] | -.15 | [-.27, -.04] | .03 | [-.08, .14] |
| Democrats | .70 | [.60, .81] | .81 | [.70, .91] | .05 | [-.06, .16] | -.03 | [-.14, .08] |
| *c* | | | | | | | | |
| Self-Affirmation | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | -.06 | [-.24, .13] | .52 | [.38, .65] | .72 | [.53, .90] | 1.38 | [1.24, 1.51] |
| Democrats | -.36 | [-.54, -.18] | .66 | [.53, .79] | .81 | [.63, .99] | 1.38 | [1.26, 1.51] |
| Self-Threat | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .06 | [-.12, .25] | .59 | [.46, .72] | .61 | [.43, .80] | 1.38 | [1.24, 1.51] |
| Democrats | -.32 | [-.50, -.14] | .74 | [.62, .87] | .85 | [.66, 1.03] | 1.38 | [1.25, 1.51] |

**Table S4.** Signal detection $d'$ scores reflecting truth sensitivity and $c$ scores reflecting response threshold in sharing political information as a function of ideology-congruence (congruent vs. incongruent), truth prompt (without truth prompt vs. with truth prompt), and participants' political affiliation (Republicans vs. Democrats), Experiment 4. Higher $d'$ scores reflect greater truth sensitivity. Higher $c$ scores reflect higher acceptance threshold.

| | Without Truth Prompt | | | | With Truth Prompt | | | |
| | Congruent | | Incongruent | | Congruent | | Incongruent | |
| | M | 95% CI | M | 95% CI | M | 95% CI | M | 95% CI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $d'$ | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | -.07 | [-.14, .01] | -.02 | [-.08, .04] | .08 | [.00, .15] | .01 | [-.05, .08] |
| Democrats | .18 | [.10, .25] | .03 | [-.03, .09] | .21 | [.14, .28] | .05 | [-.01, .11] |
| $c$ | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | .40 | [.23, .56] | 1.19 | [1.06, 1.31] | 1.01 | [.84, 1.17] | 1.47 | [1.35, 1.60] |
| Democrats | .20 | [.03, .36] | 1.16 | [1.04, 1.29] | .98 | [.82, 1.14] | 1.48 | [1.36, 1.60] |